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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UNITED AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation, and ZIONS FIRST
NATIONAL BANK, National Association, a
rorporation,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
vs.

GARY J. WILLEY and JEAN M. WILLEY,
his wife, HORIZON INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a corporation, OAK HILLS RECREATION CLUB, a corporation, WESTERN
STATES INVESTMENT, INC., a corporation,
WESTERN STATES TITLE INSURANCE
COMP ANY, a corporation, TOWNE APTS., a
corporation, INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL
CORPORATION, a corporation, WILLIAM
MARCUS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN REFRIGERATION, INC., HOLBROOK COMPANY, UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION, IDEAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION, OLYMPIA SALES COMPANY,
UTAH CONCRETE PIPE COMPANY, FEDERAL BUILDING & LOAN, MELVIN E.
INGERSOLL, THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, R. W. TAYLOR STEEL CO., LUCY
STACY, CHARLESWORTH PLUMBING &
HEATING CO., and DOHRMANN COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
11086

BRIEF 0'F RESP'ONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
'L1his is a suit containing five causes of action which
\Yas commenced by plaintiffs for the purpose of fore(']0sing the liens of a trust deed, a chattel mortgage,
1

three mortgages, and a conditional sales contract PXecuted by the appellants, Gary J. -Willey, Jean M. WillPy
and Horizon Investment Corporation, in which appellant~
interposed the defense and counterclaim of usury insofar
as plaintiffs' first cause of action was concerned.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based npon
the pleadings, the deposition of defendant-appellant Gan
J. Willey and the uncontroverted affidavits attached to
plaintiffs' motion. Defendants-appellants also moved for
summary judgment, based upon the pleadings and upon
a legal memorandum filed by defendants-appellants in
support of their motion. The lower court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied defendants appellants' motion. Judgment was entered which
(1) dismissed with prejudice defendants - appellants'
counterclaims, (2) decreed the amounts due to respondent, United American Life Insurance Company from the
defendants-appellants on United American Life Insurance Company's various liens, (3) decreed the amount'
due to numerous other parties from def endants-apprllants, ( 4) determined the priority of the liens of respondent and the other parties, and ( 5) ordered tlw
various properties sold and the proceeds applie<l in
satisfaction of the liens of the various parties in the
order of their priority.
After judgment was entered, defcndants-appcllanhl,
in lieu of filing a supersedeas bond, moved the lower co11rt
for an order staying any further proceedings until this
2

appral has been heard by the Utah Supreme Court.
This motion was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the summary judgment
awarded in favor of plaintiff, United American Insurance Company, on the first cause of action, and seek
an order extending appellants' redemption rights for a
period of six months after termination of this litigation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following are the facts as testified to by the
appellant Gary J. Willey in his deposition.
Horizon Investment Corp,. is a corporation which
was organized in 1963 by Gary J. Willey and Jean M.
Willey, his wife, for the purpose of constructing a Country Club on property located in Weber County, Utah.
Gary J. Willey and Jean M. Willey are the sole stockholders of the corporation and Gary J. Willey is its
president while Jean M. Willey is its Secretary. (R. 28,
P. 4-5) (Unless otherwise stated all references in this
Brief to the record will refer to pages in the deposition
of appellant Gary J. Willey). By October of 1964 the
appellants had become indebted to Zions First National
Dank (hereinafter referred to as "Zions") in the sum
of T·wo HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($270,000.00) on prior loans which Zions had
made to appellants to finance the construction of the
Country Club (p. 13). In October of 1964 appellant
Uary J. "Willey approached Zions and requested a loan
3

of FOUR HUNDRED l!'Il!''l1 Y rrHOUSAND DOLLAH~
($450,000.00) for the purpose of paying off the existing
r_f'WO HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND DOLLAR
( $270,000.00) in de Ltedness and of obtaining ad<li tional
capital. Zions refused to loan appellants any furtl!Pr
money unless appellants would get a written commitment
from some insurance company to purchase the loan from
Zions should Zions so demand. (p. 14). Zions did not
tell appellants from whom to get the commitment. ThP
only thing demanded by Zions was that the commitment
would require the company issuing it to purclia~e thr
loan from Zions should Zions so demand and that the
company issuing the commitment be substantial enough
to take up the loan. (p. 17, 18).
Appellant Gary J. Willey, through a broker hy the
name of Jesse Noble, contacted United American Life
Insurance Company (hereinafter called "United Anwrican") and requested United American to issue the <'Oltlmitment which Zions required as a condition to making
appellants the FOUR HUNDRB~D FIFTY THOUSAND
DOLLAR ($450,000.00) loan. (p. 11, 15). Mr. Noble was
the agent of appellant Gary J. Willey and neither :Mr.
Noble, nor his associate, Mr. Robert Campbell, were
employees of United American. (p. 15).
After some negotiations, United American agreed
to issue its commitment to Zions for a fee of $9,000.00,
two per cent of the principal amount of the loan. (p. 21)
In addition, appellants agreed to deposit the sum of
FORTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($45,000.00)
with United American. If Zions did not require Unitrd
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American to purchase the loan or if appellants refinanced
th~ loan, or if appellants obtained some third party to
purchase the loan from Zions, then the FORTY FIVE
THOUSAND DOLLAR ($45,000.00) deposit would be
returned to appellants, with interest. (pp. 45-46, 69-70)
On the basis of United American's commitment Zions
loaned appellants FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($450,000.00). A little over a year
passed, during which time appellants did not refinance
the loan or obtain a third party to purchase it from
Zions. In January 1966, Zions demanded that United
American purchase the loan and United American purchased the loan from Zions as they were required to do
by the commitment. (p. 27) Appellants made none of the
payments which thereafter came due on the loan and in
October of 1966 foreclosure proceedings were instituted.
(p. 25)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL OF THE FACTS UPON WHICH THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS BASED ARE UNCONTESTED
FACTS, BEING THE FACTS AS TESTIFIED TO
BY THE APPELLANT, GARY J. WILLEY, IN HIS
DEPOSITION, AND, WHERE THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT TO BE TRIED,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED.

The respondents agree basically with appellant's general Htatements concerning summary judgment. It is true
that summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should
be granted only when it is clear that there are no genuine
is::mes of material fact to be resolved. That is exactly
the situation which exists in this case.
5

The facts upon which the summary judgment j3
based are not the facts as alleged by United American.
They are the facts as testified to under oath by thP
appellant, Gary J. Willey, in his deposition. United
American for the purpose of its motion for summary
judgment, conceded that everything that Gary J. Willey
testified to was absolutely true. Under these circumstances, summary judgment was properly granted. As
stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Samms
v. Eccles, 11 U.2d 289, 358 Pac.2nd 344, 345:
"A motion for ~mmmary judgment is in effect
a demurrer to the claims of the plaintiff, saying:
Assuming they are true no right to recover is
shown."
Assuming that everything which Gary Willey testified to in his deposition is absolutely true, and based
upon that deposition, summary judgment should have
been granted since the testimony of Gary Willey himself
established there was no violation of the usury laws.
As pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in the
case of Dupler vs. Yates, 10 U.2d 251, 351 Pac.2d 624
(1960) there can be no stronger evidence in support of
a movant's motion for summary judgment than the sworn
testimony of the opponent himself. In that case, the
the defendant in a fraud action introduced in support
of his motion for summary judgment depositions of the
plaintiff wherein the plaintiff had testified that he had
relied on the statements of persons other than the defendant in entering into the transaction in question. 'l'he
Supreme Court in holding that defendant's motion for
6

summary judgment had been properly granted stated at
pp. G35-636 of its opinion:
"In contrast to self-serving declarations usually proffered by movants for summary judgment.
these statements are made by the opposing parties themselves. Presenting at most improbable
questions of credibility these documentary statements have a high degree of probative value."

In spite of this, the appellants contend that there
are genuine issues of fact involved in this action which
should be resolved by trial. However, as stated by the
8upreme Court in the case of Menlove vs. Salt Lake
County, 18 U.2d 203, 418 Pac.2d 227 (1966):
"Rule 56, U.R.C.P. dictates the granting of
summary judgment where there is no genuine
issue of material fact. The whole purpose of summary judgment would be defeated if a case could
be forced to go to trial by a mere assertion that
an issue exists."
The six asserted issues of fact which appellants
claim should preclude the granting of summary judgment
in this case are set forth on page 13 of appellants' brief.
'l1he first of these asserted issues is "whether the commissions paid to Noble and Campbell should be considPred as interest."
This is the first time that this alleged issue has been
raised by the appellants. This claim was never asserted
in either the answer and counterclaim of the appellants
(R. 5) or in their amended counterclaim (R. 24). It is
\l'Pll settled in this state that the Supreme Court will
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not consider issues which are raised for the first tirnP
on appeal. In re: Ekkers Estate, 432 Pac.2d 45 (Utah,
1967); American Oil Company vs. General Contracti11g
Corp., 17 U.2d 330, 411 Pac.2d 486 (1966); Hamilto11 cs.
Salt Lake Compauy Sewerage Improvement District
No. 1, 15 U.2d 216, 390 Pac.2d 235 (1964); Tygescn vs.
Magna Waer Co., 13 U.2d 397, 375 Pac.2d 456 (19G2);
Carson vs. Douglas, 12 U.2d 424, 307 Pac.2d 462 (1%2):
North Salt Lake vs. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Com
pany, 118 Utah 600, 223 Pac.2d 577 (1950); Neilso11 rs.
};isen, 116 Ut. 343, 209 Pac.2d 928 (1949);
Even if this question had been raised in the lower
court the testimony of the appellant Gary J. Willey
effectively disposes of this alleged issue. It is almost
universally recognized that a payment by a borrower
to his own agent of a commission for procuring a loan
from a lender cannot make the loan usurious. An extensive annotation on this point is contained in 52 ALR 2d
703 wherein it is stated at page 710:
"It has generally been held or recognized that
a lender cannot he charged ·with nsnry on account
of any commission or bonus paid by the borrower
to his mvn ag0nt, or to an independent broker,
for services in negotiating or procuring the loan."
This statement is supported in the annotation by
numerous cases from 31 different jurisdictions.
The appellant Gary J. Willey testified in his depo8ition that he contacted Mr. Campbell, who in turn, contacted Mr. Noble, who, as agent for appellants in turn
approached United American for the purpose of obtain
ing the commitment required by Zions.
8

1

"Q. When did you first contact United American?
"A. The contact was not made by myself.
"Q. Who was it made by?
"A. It was made by a Mr. Jess Noble of Denver,
Colorado.
"Q. And who is Mr. Noble?
"A. He was a former employee of United American, and is now - I would say he considers
himself a broker. (p. 11)
"Q. Now how did you get in touch with Mr. Noble
regarding him procuring a loan?
"A. This \Vas through a gentleman by the name
of Robert Campbell of Denver, Colorado.
(p. 12)

"Q. Then I assume this was when you approached
United American Life?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you requested them to give Zions a commitment to take out the loan?
"A. This was requested by Mr. Nob le, my agent
in the matter or broker.
"Q. On behalf of Horizon?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And when did this take place?
"A. November of 1965.
"Q. Now, were all the negotiations for obtaining
of this loan commitment from United American made through your agent, Mr. Noble?
"A. You say all of the negotiations?
"Q. Yes.
"A. Through Mr. Noble and Mr. Campbell, the
two of them. They both received a fee for
this.
9

"Q. Was Mr. Noble at this time employed by

United American?
"A. No.

"Q. No?
"A. No.
"Q. Neither was Mr. Campbell?
"A. No. (pp. 14-15)"
The testimony of Gary \Villey is unequivocal on the
point that the brokers involved in this transaction werr
his own agents, and the law is unequivocal on the point
that any payments made by a borrower to his own agent~
for procuring a loan cannot make the loan usurious.
The second, third and fifth alleged issues of fact
which appellants claim prevent the granting of sununary
judgment are, " ( 2) whether the interest computations
should be based upon the face amount of the note or
on the amount received by the borrower, (3) whl'ther
the interest should be computed on a per annum basis
. . . ( 5) what effect the one year interim period had on
the loan." None of these points invlove questions of
fact at all. How interest should be computed in determining whether a loan is usurious and whether or not
an interim period affects the application of the usury
statutes are questions of law.
"Summary judgment is proper where there
is a question of law but no issue of fact. Grant
of the motion is not precluded because the question of law is important, difficult or complicated.
It is for the court to decide whether full development of the facts and surrounding circumstances
will assist it in making a correct determination of
the question of law. Normally where the onl,1·
10

conflict is as to what legal conclusions should be
drawn from the undisputed facts, a summary judgment should be entered." 3Barron and Holtzoff,
Fed. Practice and Procedure, Section 1234, pp.
126-128.
All of the facts concerning the amount and terms
of the loan, the interest rate provided by the note and
application of the loan proceeds are all described in
drtail in the deposition of the appellant, Gary Willey,
and are set forth and analyzed in points 2, 3 and 4 of
this Brief. Based upon these facts, the only question left
for the trial court to decide was the legal question as
to how the usury statute was to be applied. That the
lower court properly applied the law in this case is hereinafter set forth in points 2, 3 and 4 of this Brief.
The fourth alleged issue of fact which appellants
claim prevent the granting of summary judgment is
''(4) whether there was a sale of credit." That the transaction between appellants and United American involved
the sale of credit and not a loan by United American to
appellants is covered in detail under Point 2 of this
Brief. Suffice it to say at this point that all of the
facts concerning this matter are testified to in detail
hy the appellant Gary J. Willey in his deposition. Where,
as here, the evidenciary facts in a case have been established and there is only a conflict as to the conclusion to
hP dra-wn from the undisputed facts, summary judgment
~honld be rendered. Fox vs. Johnson, & Wimsatt, Inc.,
127 F.2d 729 (U.S. App. D.C. 1942) ; U. S. vs. Two
Thonsa11d Tubitlar Plastic Cases, 231 F.Supp. 236 (D.C.
Pa. 1964), affirmed 352 F.2nd 344; U. S. vs. General
11

Instrurnent Corp., 87 F.Supp. 157 (D.C.N.J. 1949); Ot 1,
& Co., vs. Pennsylvania RR Co., 61 F. 8upp. 905 (D.C.Pa.
1945), affirmed 155 F.2d 522; Trinity Universal In0itrance Co. vs. Woody, 47 F.Supp. 327 (D.C.N.J. 1942);
3Barron & Holtzoff, Section 1234, supra.
The sixth alleged issue of fact which appellants claim
prevents the granting of surmnary judgment is ''(G)
whether a service charge was specifically designated."
By this, the appellants are apparently referring to
whether there was any specific designation concerning
the NINE THOUSAND DOLLAR fee paid to United
American for its commitment or concerning the $45,000
deposit made by the appellants. The testimony of the
defendant Gary J. Willey establishes that there was a
specific designation concerning the $9,000 fee as well
as concerning the $45,000 deposit. Gary "Willey testified
at pp. 49 and 50 of his deposition that the $9,000 fee
was specifically designated in both the disburseirn•nt
schedule and the commitment which was given to Zions:

"Q. What document would the $9,000 be mentioned in?

"A. In the disbursement of the total loan. Disbursement schedule, I am quite sure it was
there.

"Q. Did you ever see a written agreement concerning the $9,000 and what it was to be
applied to?

"A. I think the $9,000 is stated in the commitment
between United American and Zions as a loan
fee for the commitment, from what I recall.''

12

rL1he deposition of appellant Gary J. Willey also
e~tahlishes that there was a specific designation relating
io the $45,000 deposit. In discussing what the $45,000
deposit was for, Gary Willey testified as follows:

"Q. What happened if you didn't get somebody
else to purchase the notes and trust instrument.
"A. They were to keep the $45,000. We'd signed
an agreement to that effect.

"Q. Do you have a copy of that

agreement~

"A. I don't here, but I sure have one at home,
or in the office I should say. I do have a
copy." (p. 46)
All six of the alleged ISsues of fact set forth by
appellants on p. 13 of their Brief are either not properly
before this court, or are not issues of fact at all but are
Y.Uestions of law which were properly decided by the
lower court, or are matters which were conclusively
Pstablished for purposes of respondent's motion for
summary judgment by the sworn testimony of the appellant Gary J. Willey. That there are no issues of fact
\ 11hich would prevent the granting of summary judgment
in this case appears to be admitted by the appellants
theirn_;elves at p. 3 of their Brief wherein they state,
"The facts as set forth on file and particularly in the
deposition of defendant Gary J. Willey were basically
undisputed."

13

POINT II
THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN UNITED AMERICAN AND APPELLANTS INVOLVED A SALE OF
CREDIT BY UNITED AMERICAN TO APPELLANTS
SO THAT APPELLANTS ON THE BASIS OF
UNITED AMERICAN'S CREDIT WOULD BE ABLE
TO OBTAIN A LOAN FROM ZIONS, AND SUCH A
LOAN OF CREDIT IS NOT GOVERNED BY THE
USURY STATUTES.

According to the testimony of the appellant Gary .T.
\Villey, the $9,000 paid to United American and the
$45,000 deposited with United American were paid, not
to obtain a loan of money from United American, but to
obtain the credit of United American in the form of
United American's written commitment to purchase the
loan from Zions on Zions' demand, so that Zions, on the
basis of United American's credit would make the loan
to appellants. United American issued its commitment
to Zions and Zions, on the basis of United American's
credit, loaned the money to appellants. No money was
ever loaned by United American to appellants.
The usury statutes are inapplicable to a transaction
such as is described in the deposition of the appellant
Gary J. Willey.
"If a transaction amounts merely to a sale
of credit it is well settled that the usury law is
inapplicable." 104 ALR 245.
This is the law in the state of Utah. As stated by
the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Rossuerg vs.
Holesapple, 123 Ut. 529, 260 P.2d, 563, 566 (1953)
"It is well established that a sale of credit, as
distinguished from a loan of money, does not conw
within the purview of usury laws."
14

The case which was cited by the Utah Supreme Court
in support of this rule is the case of Oil City Motor Co.
L'S. CIT Corporation, 76 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1935). This
case concerned an involved situation whereby plaintiff
automobile dealer purchased automobiles from the manufacturer through sight drafts drawn on and paid by
the defendant. Although the fees received by the defendant for this service far exceeded the amounts permitted under the usury laws, the court held there was
no violation of the usury statutes.
"Instead of making a loan of money, defendant lent or extended its credit which plaintiff
used in the operation of its retail business. A
return demanded and received for a bona fide
loan or extension of credit as distinguished from
a loan of money does not taint the transaction
with usury regardless of the amount."
A case involving a fact situation very similar to the
one before this court is Lynn vs. McCue, 94 Kan. 761,
147 Pac.808 (1915). This case involved a construction
company (the borrower) a trust company and a bank.
~'he facts of the case and the holding of the court are
set forth by the court as follows:
"The construction company applied to the
trust company for a loan of $400,000. The trust
company at first considered making it, but finally
refused to do so on the ground that the highest
lawful rate of interest was not sufficient compensation, in view of the risk involved. Then the
trust company offered to procure the loan from
the bank for a commission of $60,000 and the offer
·was accepted and carried ont. To induce the bank
to make the loan, the trust company agreed to
take it up at any time on demand of the bank,

15

and within a short time did so. If the deal wa,
just what it was purported to be, it was legitimate; the $60,000 was paid as a commission and
not as interest and did not constitute usury."
The most recent case on this point appears to lw
Gilmer vs. w oodson, 332 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964). rrhP
case involved a claim of usury arising out of the development of a subdivision. The developer needed large ::;mn~
of money to construct improvements in the subdivi::;ion.
He approached a bank to obtain these funds and the bank
agreed to provide the funds, providing the plaintiff
would endorse the unsecured notes evidencing the loans.
For endorsing the notes the developer was to pay the
plaintiff fees of from three to six per cent of the amount
of the notes. After lending money to the developer for
approximately two years, on this basis, the bank required
the developer to execute a trust deed to secure the
amounts which had been loaned. The developer later got
into financial difficulty the bank demanded payment from
the plaintiff of all of the notes which had been endorsed
by plaintiff and the plaintiff purchased the notes from
the bank and took an assignment of the trust deed. In
this case, between the plaintiff and the developer's trustee
in bankruptcy the trustee raised the defense of usury,
claiming that the interest provided by the notes plus
the fees charged by plaintiff were interest charges in
excess of those permitted by statute. This contention
was rejected by the court, which held that the fres
charged by plaintiff were for a loan of credit and did
not violate the usury laws. The court stated:
"HO\vever, it is clear from the record as found
by the District Court that the bank, not Gilnwr
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was the actual lender, that the bank had no interest whatsoever in such payments and that the
fees or charges were not usurious. The District
Court properly reversed the findings and conclusions of the referee and held that the endorsements fees to Gilmer, both paid and unpaid, were
lawful. See Chakalcs vs. Djiovamidcs, 161 Va.48,
170 S.E.848 (1933); Keagy vs. Trout, 85 Va.390,
7 S.E.329 (1888) ; Ann. 52 AtL·R 2d 703, 710 (1957)"
Other cases involving similar fact situations are
1lfarphy vs. Leiber, 76 Ariz.79, 259 P.2d 249 (1953), and
Kahan vs. Schonwald, 192 Okla.307, 135 P.2d 971 (1943).
In the Murphy vs. Leiber case, the court held as follows:
"The trial court having found as a fact that
the conveyance of Section 29 to defendants by
plaintiffs was made in consideration of def endants loaning their credit to plaintiff the conclusion of law that the transaction was not usurious
is inescapable for the reason that usury laws have
no application to a loan or sale of credit."
In the Kahan vs. Schonwald case, the Supreme Court
in upholding the denial of defendant's motion to amend
his answer so as to plead the defense of usury stated:
"The contention that it was error to deny
the defendant leave to amend his answer so as
to plead usury in the transaction is wholly untenable. The evidence shows that the note involved
had been given in consideration of the services
of the plaintiff in going surety on a note for
$10,000 ·which defendant executed to the First
National Bank to Gutherie to obtain a loan of
money from such institution and that as between
plaintiff and defendant the relation of borrower
and lender was non-existent. Usury can be plead
only where the relation of borrower and lender
exi~ts between the parties."
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The sworn testimony of the appellant Gary J. Willey
establishes conclusively that the transaction between
United American and appellants in this case involved a
sale of credit by United American to appellants, in tlw
form of United American's commitment to Zions, so
that Zions, on the basis of United American's credit
would make appellant the $450,000.00 loan. The facts m:
testified to by Gary J. Willey are as follows:
Prior to the time United American ever became
involved in this matter, appellants had become indebtrd
to Zions in the sum of $270,000.00. (p. 13) Appellants
contacted Zions to have the loan increased to $450,000.00
but Zions refused to loan appellants any further money
unless appellants would furnish Zions with a commitment
from some third party which ·would obligate the third
party to purchase the loan from Zions, or make a iw"·
loan to pay off Zions, should Zions so demand. Zion~
did not indicate to appellants from whom to get tlw
commitment. It was then that appellants approached
United American, through appellants' own agent, anil
requested United American to give tht> commitment so
that Zions would make the loan to appellants.

"Q. When did yon go to Zions, or did .Yon go to
Zions to see about increasing this $270,000
lo'an.
"A. Yes, I did.
"Q. When was that?
"A. That was the latter part of October or the
first part of N overnber.
"Q. \Vhat did yon "'ant it increased to 1
"A. Approximak,ly $Mi0,000.00.
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"Q. Did you see Mr. Hintze regarding this particular loan~
"A. Mr. Hintze and Mr. Roy Simmons.
"Q. And did Zions at that time make you a $450,000.00 loan~
"A. No. They said it was necessary to secure a
long term commitment before they "\vould be
willing to issue $450,000.00.
"Q. They wouldn't make the loan unless you had
a commitment from somebody else to purchase the loan or make a new loan to take
them out~
"A. They made a loan of $270,000.00 without the
long term condition. The additional money
they required the commitment.
"Q. Did they state from whom they would accept
a commitmenU
"A. No.
"Q. Then I assume this was when you approached
United American Life~
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you requested them to give Zions a commitment to take out the loan~
"A. This was requested by Mr. Noble, my agent
in the matter, or broker.
"Q. On behalf of Horizon~
"A. Yes. (p. 14-15)
"Q. Did you explain to United American that you
had applied to Zions for a $450,000.00 loan~
"A. Yes.
"Q. And that Zions had agreed to make you a
$450,000 loan providing you could get a com-
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mitment from some other organization to purchase it?
"A. It was stated from an insurance company a commitment from an insurance company,
and one that ·was substantial enongh to mah
the loan. (p. 16-17)
After some negotiations United American issued th~
required commitment to Zions and Zions made the $450,000 loan to appellants. United American charged appdlants $9,000.00 for issuing the commitment and in addition, required appellants to deposit $45,000.00 with UnitPd
American. If United American was not required by
Zions to purchase the loan, or if appellants secured
another company to purchase the loan from Zions, or
if appellants refinanced the Zions loan, the $45,000.00
deposit would be returned to appellants, with interest.
"Q. Now, wlwn did Unikd Anwrican agrPP to
give you a commitment?
"A. It -vrns approximately December 10th that tht>y
sent the commitment over. Mr. Campbell and
Mr. Noble were here in Salt Lah. They received the commitment by Air ExprPss REA, I should say, and it was taken into
Zions National Bank and discussed ·with Mr.
Hintze. (P. 17)

"Q. The commitment, did it give Zions the right

to require United American to buy this loan
from them, was that the form of the commitment?
"A. Would yon state that again"? Give t11m1 tll\'
right?
"Q. Did it give~ Zions the right to require Unitt>cl
American to buy the loan that Zions \\H~
making to you?
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"A. Yes, I would say so, subject to marketable
title and various things that were necessary.

"Q. When was yom loan closed with Zions, that
is your $450,000 loan 7
"A. From what I recall, it was approximately
December 15. (p. 18-19)
"Q. Mr. Willey, I'm a little confused by the financing arrangements you had with United
American Life and Zions Bank, particularly
in regard to $45,000 which apparently yon
deposited in your account and then wrote a
check to, I believe you said, United American
Life. Could you explain to me what that
was for?
"A. This fee was held strictly for the purpose
of them issuing a commitment. If I were to
secure another company to take Zions National Bank out of the loan, the fee was to
be returned to me.
"Q. It was to be returned to you 7
"A. Yes.
"Q. If you found another company7
"A. Yes. (p. 45)
"Q. Now, the $9,000 that you referred to that you
sent to United American Life, that was
another fee separate and apart from the
$45,000 fee7
"A. Yes.
"Q. Who did that go to 7
"A. United American Life. This was for the issuance of the commitment. (P. 48-49)
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A little over a year after the commitment was issued
Zions demanded that United American purchase the loan
pursuant to the terms of the commitment and the loan
was purchased by United American from Zions and
United American paid Zions for purchase of the loan
in January, 1966.
"A.... But United paid Zions off, so it went into
'66. I \Vas wrong in December of '6G. It wa~
the latter part of January of '66 when United
American sent a check to Zions National
Bank.

"Q. And purchased this loan from Zions?
"A. That's right.
"Q. Pursuant to the commitment that they had
already issued?
"A. Yes. (p. 27)
The transaction between United American and appellants is summarized by the appellant Gary J. -Wille>· at
pp. 69-70 of his deposition as follows:

"Q. I just want to go back for a minute, Mr.
Willey, on this $9,000 and $45,000. Tht>se
amounts wen~ paid, yon say, to Unih·d Amrrican to get them to give this cornmitme11t to
Zions so Zions wonld make you the loan 1
"A. Definitely.
"Q. And if United American was requirrd hy
Zions to buy the loan at the end of tlw
year, United Anwrican would keep the moneyl
"A. Definitely.
"Q. If yon went out and were abh~ to get financing
s01"newhere else to pa:' off Zions so th'.lt
United AmL'rican wonldn't haw to hn:· 1t,
then yon would get $45,000 baek?
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"A. I would get that returned, plus interest.

"Q. Plus interest 1
''A. Yes.
Respondents agree with the general statements contained in appellant's brief to the effect that the court
should carefully scrutinize every transaction in which
usury is pleaded to determine whether the transaction involved is in actuality a loan of money or whether it is a sale
of credit. The principal test apparently used by the courts
in determining whether a particular transaction involves
a loan of money or a sale of credit is set forth as follows
in an annotation on this point at 104 ALR 245, 246:
"Again, consideration must be given to the
particular facts to determine whether one of the
parties to the transaction is to advance money,
or whether the advance is to be made in the first
instance by a third party. If, for instance, the
transaction is one not contemplating the immediate advance of money by a party thereto, but
merely a means of enabling one of the parties to
procure funds from a third party, or otherwise
meet his immediate financial needs, it is properly
deemed a sale of credit, as regards application
of the usury statutes, although eventually the
party permitting the use of his credit has to advance the money before he is placed in funds or
property by the one receiving the credit."
The testimony of Gary J. Willey on this point is
clear and definite. The loan to appellants was not made
b~, United American, whom appellants contend exacted
the usurious interest, but was made by Zions. The payments made by appellants to United American and the
amount deposited with United American by appellants
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was a means of appellants obtaining the conunitment
'
thereby enabling appellant's to procure the loan from
Zions to meet appellants' immediate financial needs. 'l'he
transaction between United American and appellants is
thus properly deemed a sale of credit as regards the
application of the usury statutes. The fact that Zion8
eventually required United American to purchase the
loan and that United American did eventually pay Zions
$450,000 and took an assignment of the loan as United
American was required to do by the commitment, doPo
not alter the situation.

As pointed out in the case of Kahan v. Schonwalrl
and Gilmer vs. Woodson, supra, "Usury can be plead
only where the relation of borrower and lender exists
between the parties." The testimony of Gary Wille!· ,
is clear on the point that no such relation ever existed
between appellants and United American, who appellants
claim exacted the usurious interest. The loan ·was made
by Zions to appellants and it was Zions money which was
loaned to appellants. (p. 18-21) None of United American's money was ever loaned to appellants. Over a year
after the commitment was issued, Zions demanded that
United American purchase the loan as United American
was required to do by the commitment, and United
American sent a check for $450,000 to Zions and purchased the loan from Zions.
The insinuations and innuendos contained in appellants' brief that there existed some insidious schenw lwtween Zions and United American to avoid the n~nn·
laws is not only without any fonndation in the record,
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but is completely refuted by Gary J. Willey in his deposition. Appellants sought the $450,000 loan from Zions,
but were informed by Zions that no loan would be made
without the required commitment. (p. 12, 14) Zions did
not tell appellants from whom they would accept the
commitment. (p. 14) Zions only requirement was that the
commitment be issued by a company substantial to take
up the loan. (p. 16-17) Appellants then contacted United
American, through appellants' own agent, and requested
United American to give Zions the commitment. (p. 1415) After some negotiations, details concerning the commitment were worked out between appellants and United
American, including the payment of the $9,000 commitment fee and the $45,000 deposit. Zions never knew
anything about the requirement of $45,000 deposit. (p. 47)
The testimony of Gary J. Willey establishes beyond
question that the transaction between United American
and appellants involved a sale of credit by United American to appellants in the form of a commitment, so that
Zions on the basis of United American's credit would
loan appellants the $450,000. None of United American's
money was ever loaned to appellants and the relationship
of borrower and lender has never existed between appellants and United American. No scheme ever existed between United American and Zions to evade the usury
statutes.
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POINT III
THE RIGHT OF UNITED AMERICAN TO RETAIN
THE $45,000 DEPOSIT WAS BASED ON A CONTINGENCY WHICH WAS COMPLETELY BEYOND THE
CONTROL OF UNITED AMERICAN, AND A CONTRACT IS NOT USURIOUS WHICH PROVIDES FOR
THE PAYMENT, ON A CONTINGENCY, OF A RETURN IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY
STATUTE, WHERE THE HAPPENING OF THE
CONTINGENCY IS NOT CONTROLLED BY THE
CREDITOR.

Law on this point is set forth m 91 C.J.S. Usury,
Section 31 ( c) as follows :
As a general rule, a contract of loan or forbearance is not usurious because stipulating for
the payment, on a contingency, of interest or a
return in excess of that permitted by law, 1d1eri·
the contingency is nnder the control of the debtor.
A debtor may not, by his voluntary act, rendPr
a transaction usurious which, but for such circumstances, would be entirely fret> from a claim of
usury. Thus, where the terms of a contract permit the debtor to discharge himself by paying the
sum lawfully due on or before a specified datP,
a provision imposing on him a more burdensolllP
payment, although exceeding the rate of retmn
allowed by law, in the nature of a lwnalt:-· for a
failure to pay by the date so specified, will not
render the contract usurious, even though the
penalt)T so imposed is the payment of a flat su]l].
Similarly, a contract is not usurious altliough
it provides for the payment of an excessivl, return
to the creditor, where it is further stipnlatr'd that
the obligation may he discharged by the pnyrn('.nt
of the principal sum and not more than hmftil
interest 'vithin or by a specified time, unless s11eh
stipulation for payrncnt is colorahle only a11o
made with intent to evadt> the nsnry laws.
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This is the situation which exists in this case.
According to the testimony of the appellant Gary J.
Willey, the $45,000 was deposited with United American
and could be retained by United American only if United
American was ultimately required to purchase the loan
from Zions as it was required to by its commitment. If,
howc>ver, (1) Zions did not make demand upon United
American to purchase the loan, or ( 2) even if Zions did
demand that United American purchase the loan but
appellants obtained some third party to purchase the
loan pursuant to Zions demand, or (3) if Zions demanded
that United American purchase the loan but appellants
refinanced the loan and paid off Zions, then in any
one of the above instances, the $45,000 would be returned
to appellants, with interest. The testimony of the appellant Gary Willey on this matter is as follows:

"Q. I just want to go back for a minute, Mr.
Willey, on this $9,000 and $45,000. These
amounts were paid, you say, to United American to get them to give this commitment to
Zions so Zions would make you the loan~
"A. Definitely.
"Q. And if United American was required by
Zions to buv the loan at the end of the year,
United Am~rican would keep the money~
"A. Definitely.
"Q. And if yon went out and were able to get
financing somewhere else to pay off Zions
so that United American wouldn't have to
buy it, then you would get the $45,000 back?
"A. I would get that returned, plus interest.

"Q. Plus interesU
"A. Yes. (p. 69-70)
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Whether the $45,000 deposit \rnnld he retained hv
United American, or whether it would be returned t~
appellants, with interest, was based on three contingencies, the happening of any one of which would reqnin
the return of the $45,000 to appellants, with interest.
The happening of any of these contingencies was ont of
the control of United American and the happening of two
of the contingencies was within the exclusive control of
the appellants.
The payment of the $9,000 to United American a~ a
commitment fee could not, of itself, make the loan usurious. This sum coupled with the eight percent interest
provided by the note, does not exceed the amount \rhich
appellants could have been charged as interest for tl1I'
year the commitment was to run, had the note bel'n
written at the maximum pt>rmissible interest rate of ten
per cent.
POINT IV
THE $9,000 PAID TO UNITED AMERICAN FOR
THE COMMITMENT, PLUS THE $45,000 DEPOSIT,
WHEN ADDED TO THE INTEREST REQUIRED
TO BE PAID BY THE TERMS OF THE NOTE, IS
LESS THAN THE AMOUNT OF INTEREST WHICH
COULD HAVE BEEN LEGALLY CHARGED AND
COLLECTED ON THE LOAN OVER THE TEN YEAR
PERIOD THE NOTE HAD TO RUN, AND THE
TRANSACTION, THEREFORE, DOES NOT VIOLATE THE USURY STATUTES.

Even if United American had made a loan of monc~
rather than a sale of credit to appellants, and even if tlw
$45,000 deposit had not been suhjPct to conditions ontside of United American's control, the transaction would
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still not violate the usury statutes. The $9,000 c01mnitment fee, plus the $45,000, when added to the interest
which appellant were required to pay by the terms of
tlw note, is less than the amount of interest which appellants could have been charged under the Utah Usury
Statutes during the term of the loan. It has long been
established that the way to determine whether or not
a payment made by a borrower to a lender to obtain
a loan makes the loan usurious is to compute the total
amount of interest which the borrower is required to pay
hy thP terms of the note over the period the note has to
nm and add to it amount of the payment made by the borrom:r to obtain the loan. If this amount does not exceed
the total amount which the lender could have collected on
his loan at the maximum permissible legal rates for the
f'ntire term of the loan then the payment made by the
borrower to the lender does not make the loan usurious.
Cases on this point from a dozen different jurisdictions
are collected in an annotation at 57 ALR 2d 649.
A case directly in point is Ricord Aragon, 115 Cal.

App. 2d 176, 251 P. 2d 759 (1952). In that case plain-

tiffs obtained a loan of $27,000 from defendants and to
induce the defendants to make the loan agreed to pay
defendants a $4,000 bonus. Plaintiffs gave defendants
a note for $31,000 representing the $27,000 loan plus the
$4,000 bonus, bearing interest at seven per cent on the
unpaid balance. Defendants took a trust deed from plaintiffs to secure the note and when plaintiffs default in payments, began foreclosure proceedings under the California ':Prust Deed Act. The plaintiff brought this action
to rl'Strain the foreclosure, to have the loan declared
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usurious and to collect the interest previously paid. Thi·
court upheld a judgment for the defendant lender8 in
the case. The bonus of $4,000, plus the seven per cent
jnterest on the note over the 58 months period the notP
was to run amounted to less than the ten per cPnt interest rate permitted by law and loan was not usurious.
The most recent case on this point appears to be the
case of Home Savings & Loan Association v. Bates, 7G
N.Mex. 660, 417 P. 2d 798 (1966). Here, the plaintiff
made a mortgage loan of $30,000 for a period of thirt~·
years, bearing interest at 6.6 per cent. In addition, the
borrower was chaged $1,085 as a fee for the loan. ThP
plaintiffs sought to foreclose the mortgage and the defense was interposed that the loan was usurious because
of the $1,085 fee that was charged for making the loan.
This contention was rejected by the New Mexico Suprenw
Court and the judgment ordering foreclosure of thP
mortgage was affirmed. The court stated:
A proper test of usury is whether figuring
all interest payments, including the portion prepaid, more than the authorized rate is required
to be paid for tlw term the loan has to run ... ·
In the. present case, the sum, including the loan
fee considPred and chargPd as interest upon the
loan, does not exceed 10 per cent per annnrn,
computed upon tlw full term of the loan. The
undisputed evidence in the record fixes th~~ interest rate, including and treating the loan fee as
prepaid interest, at 6.85 per cent per annum.
The applicable portion of the Utah usury statute
1s set forth on page 7 of appPllants' brief. Under that
statute the maximum amount which lenders can cJiargP
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for a loan of money in the State of Utah is 4 per cent
of the original principal amount of the loan, plus 10
per cent per annum on the unpaid balance. This would
permit a lender to charge a total of $282,359.54 on the
note involved in this action over the 10 year period the
note had to run. (See the computation attached to R. 30).
The total interest collectible on the note as it is written
with interest at 8 per cent per annum and with principal
payrrnms payable quarterly would require defendants to
pay only $211,538.27 over the 10 year period. (See computation attached to R. 30) Add to this the $45,000
deposit and the $9,000 commitment fee and the total
amount collectible is still only $265,538.27, or $16,821.27
less than the amount of interest which appellants could
haye been charged without exceeding the usury statutes.
There appears to be a split of authority as to how
the aforementioned calculations should be made. 57 ALR
2d 630. One group of jurisdictions holds that in determining the maximum amount which the lender can charge
for the term of the loan, the maximum legal rates perrnitted by statute should be applied to the face amount
of the note. e.g. Ricord v. Aragon and Home Savings &
Loan Association v. Bates, supra. Another group of
jnrisdictions has taken the position that the amount paid
by the borrower to the lender for the loan should first
be deducted from the face amount of the loan and that
the maximum interest rates permitted by law should then
he applied to this reduced figure. The latter method is
the one which appellants urge should be adopted by this
court, since this is the only method of computation by
which the amounts paid in this case could be construea
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to exceed the interest permitted by the Utah u:sury
statute.
This question of method of computation has newr
been decided by this court. The matter was ne\-er evui
raised in the case of National American Life f 11s11ranc1
Conipany v. Bayoit Cowitry ClitlJ, Jue., 15 Ut.2d 41i,
403 P. 2d 26, which appellants cite in support of their
position.
The method which appellants urge this court to adopt
is founded upon a logical inconsistency which respondents contend should prevent its adoption. They begin by
stating that the $9,000 commitment fee and the $45,00U
deposit should be applied in reduction of the princi1ial
balance of the $450,000 loan, thereby reducing this balance to $396,000, and it is this $396,000 figure to which
the maximum permissible interest rates should be applied
to determine the maximum amount of interest whirh
could be collected on the loan. Appellants then turn
around and state that the $9,000 commitment fee and tlw
$45,000 deposit should be considered to be interest and
should be added to the interest payments required by
the terms of the note. This donhle application of the
$9,000 commitment fee and the $45,000 deposit - stated
by appellants in one breath to be a payment in reduction
of the principal balance, and in the next, to be a paymrnt
of interest - should be rejected by this court. It is
suggested that perhaps a borrower should have his choice
as to whether to consider such payment as a payment
of interest, or \1-hether it should be applied in iwlnction o[
principal, but it is inconcPivahle that appellantf; could
l1ave it at once be a payment in reduction of principal
and, at the same time, a payment of interest.
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POINT V
THERE IS NO AUTHORITY UNDER UTAH LAW
FOR A COURT TO EXTEND A REDEMPTION PERIOD IN FORECLOSURE ACTIONS, AND NO EXTENSION OF THE REDEMPTION PERIOD SHOULD
BE GRANTED WHERE APPELLANTS FAILED TO
AVAIL THEMSELVES OF AN ADEQUATE REMEDY WHICH IS PROVIDED BY LAW.

The appellants have requested this court for an
order extending their redemption rights until six months
after termination of this litigation. Rule 69 (f) (3), Utah
Hnles of Civil Procedure provides for a six month redemption period following the date of the Sheriff's Sale.
There is no provision, either in the Rules or in Chapter
37 of Title 78, dealing with mortgage foreclosures, which
provides for any extension of this six month period of
redemption.
Rules 62( d) and 73( d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing with snperseadas bonds, provided appellants
with adequate protection in this case. By filing a superseadas bond the appellants could have prevented Sheriff':::; Sale of the property from having taken place at all
until after this appeal had been heard. This, the appellants decided not to do. Instead, appellants filed a motion with the District Court to stay the sale of the
property. This motion was made without any notice what~oever to any of the dozen other parties to the law suit
who ·were also seeking to have the property sold to satisfy
their liens. (R. 38) Under the circumstances the District
Court had no alternative but to deny appellants motion
for a stay.
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The appellants, having failed to avail thernselnB
of the protection which is afforded them by the filing
of a superseadas bond, should not at this late date be
awarded a remedy which is sanctioned by neither rule
nor statute.
CONCLUSION
All of the facts upon which the summary judgments
is based are the facts as testified to by the appellant
Gary J. Willey in his deposition. There can be no stronger
case in support of a motion for summary judgment than
the sworn testimony of the person opposing the motion.
In contrast to self-serving affidavits which are often
made the basis for a motion for summary judgment, the
foundation for the summary judgment in this case is the
sworn testimony of appellant Gary J. Willey himself.
It is his testimony which establishes that the usury claim
of appellants is baseless and without merit.
The appellant testified over and over again that the
$9000 commitment fee and the $45,000 deposit were paid
to United American, not to obtain a loan from United
American, but to obtain the credit of United American
in the form of a commitment, so that Zions, on the hasis
of United American's credit would make the loan to
appellants. The loan was not made by United American
to appellants, but was made by Zions on the basis of
United American's credit. The testimony of appellant
Gary J. Willey further establishes that the transaction
was not some scheme between United American and
Zions to violate the usury statutes. Gary J. Willey testified that Zions did not tell appellants from whom to
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obtain the required commitment; that appellants contacted United American through appellants own agents
and requested United American to give Zions the commitment so that Zions, on the basis of that commitment,
would make the loan to appellants; that Zions never even
knew of the $45,000 deposit. The law is well settled that
a ~,;ale of credit as is established by the testimony of
appellant Gary J. Willey in this case does not come
within the purview of the usury laws. The appellant
Gary J. Willey was insistent in his claim that the right
of United American to retain the $45,000 deposit was
1·onditioned upon contingencies which were beyond the
control of United American. He testified that should
Zions not make demand upon United American to
purchase the lo·an, or even if such demand was made
hut appellants obtained some third party to purchase
the loan, or if appellants refinanced the loan and paid
off Zions so that United American did not have to
buy it, that not only would the $45,000 be returned to
appellants, but that it would be returned with interest.
lt has generally been held that a charge of usury cannot
be predicated upon such a conditional payment where the
contingencies upon which the payment is made are out:side the control of the creditor.
Even if the transaction involved m this case had
not constituted a sale of credit, and even if the retention
by United American of the $45,000 had not been subject
to contingencies outside of United American's control,
the transaction would still not violate the usury laws~
since the amount of the commitment fee and the amount
of the deposit, when added to the total amount of interest
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which appellants were required to pay by the ttmrn; of
the note, is less than the amount appellants could haYe
been charged as interest had the note been written at
the highest lawful rate. The only way the commitment
fee and deposit involved in this case could make the
loan usurious, would be if this court adopted a method
of computation which would apply the deposit and commitment fee in reduction of the principal amount of the
loan, and at the same time, treat them as paymenb of
interest.
Between December of 1965 and March of 1966,
United American loaned appellants an additional $45,000
to aid appellants in establishing a successfnl venture.
1~wenty-five thousand of this amount was loaned to the
appellants without interest. None of it ·was ever repaid.
In the more than 20 months between the date Zions made
its loan to appellants and the date these foreclosure proceedings were instituted, appellants made no pa)1nents
\vhatsoever on the loan. The appe1lants should not be
permitted through insinuation and innuendo, through
strained construction of tlw facts and through urging
thP court to adopt illogical rulrs of law, to tnrn the
shield of the usury statutes into a sword. The decision of
the lower court should be affirmed.
Res1wctfully submitted,
Roger .J. McDonough, of
,
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOh.
& McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Respondents
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